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Abstract
The vulnerability to adversarial attacks has been
a critical issue for deep neural networks. Address-
ing this issue requires a reliable way to evaluate
the robustness of a network. Recently, several
methods have been developed to compute robust-
ness quantification for neural networks, namely,
certified lower bounds of the minimum adversar-
ial perturbation. Such methods, however, were
devised for feed-forward networks, e.g. multi-
layer perceptron or convolutional networks. It re-
mains an open problem to quantify robustness for
recurrent networks, especially LSTM and GRU.
For such networks, there exist additional chal-
lenges in computing the robustness quantifica-
tion, such as handling the inputs at multiple steps
and the interaction between gates and states. In
this work, we propose POPQORN (Propagated-
output Quantified Robustness for RNNs), a gen-
eral algorithm to quantify robustness of RNNs,
including vanilla RNNs, LSTMs, and GRUs. We
demonstrate its effectiveness on different network
architectures and show that the robustness quan-
tification on individual steps can lead to new in-
sights.
1. Introduction
Deep learning has led to remarkable performance gains on
a number of tasks, i.e. image classification, speech recogni-
tion, and language processing. Nevertheless, recent litera-
ture has demonstrated that adversarial examples broadly ex-
ist for deep neural networks in these applications (Szegedy
et al., 2014; Kurakin et al., 2017; Jia & Liang, 2017; Car-
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lini & Wagner, 2018). A small perturbation that humans
are mostly immune to can be crafted to mislead a neural
network’s predictions. As deep neural networks have been
widely employed in many safety-critical applications (Sharif
et al., 2016; Kurakin et al., 2017; Eykholt et al., 2018), it is
crucial to know when such models will fail and what can be
done to make them more robust to the adversarial attacks.
Studies on the robustness of neural networks mainly fall in
two categories: (1) Attack-based approaches – researchers
try to design strong adversarial attack algorithms to attack
deep neural networks and the robustness is measured by
the distortion between successful adversarial examples and
the original ones. (2) Verification-based approaches (Katz
et al., 2017; Cheng et al., 2017), which aim to find the mini-
mum distortion of neural networks or its lower bounds that
are agnostic to attack methods. Existing verification-based
methods were mainly devised for feed-forward networks,
such as multi-layer perceptron. Robustness verification for
recurrent neural networks (RNNs), which have been widely
used in speech recognition and natural language processing,
has not been systematically investigated.
To verify the robustness of RNNs, we face several new
challenges: (1) Some popular RNN formulations, including
LSTM and GRU, involve hidden states that are indirectly
determined by three to four gates. These nonlinear gates
are tightly coupled together, which we refer to as cross-
nonlinearity. This substantially complicates the verification
of robustness. (2) RNNs are widely adopted for applica-
tions with sequential inputs, e.g. sentences or time series.
However, previous verification methods typically assume
that the inputs were fed into the network at the bottom layer.
Hence, they are not directly applicable here. (3) For ap-
plications with sequential inputs, imperceptible adversarial
examples may correspond to texts with least number of
changed words (Gao et al., 2018). Thus it is critical to evalu-
ate the hardness of manipulating one single word (one input
frame) instead of all words.
In this paper, we tackle the aforementioned problems by
proposing an effective robustness quantification frame-
work called POPQORN (Propagated-output Quantified
Robustness for RNNs) for RNNs. We bound the non-
linear activation function using linear functions. Starting
from the output layer, linear bounds are propagated back to
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Table 1. Comparison of methods for evaluating RNN robustness.
Method Task Application Architecture Attack Verification Robustness guarantee
FGSM (Papernot et al., 2016a) Categorical/ Sequential NLP LSTM X × ×
(Gong & Poellabauer, 2017) Categorical Speech WaveRNN (RNN/ LSTM) X × ×
Houdini (Cisse´ et al., 2017) Sequential Speech DeepSpeech-2 (LSTM) X × ×
(Jia & Liang, 2017) SQuAD NLP LSTM X × ×
(Zhao et al., 2018) Categorical NLP LSTM X × ×
(Ebrahimi et al., 2018a;b) Categorical/ Sequential NLP LSTM X × ×
Seq2Sick (Cheng et al., 2018) Sequential NLP Seq2seq (LSTM) X × ×
C&W (Carlini & Wagner, 2018) Sequential Speech DeepSpeech (LSTM) X × ×
CLEVER (Weng et al., 2018b) Categorical CV/ NLP/ Speech RNN/ LSTM/ GRU × X ×
POPQORN (This work) Categorical CV/ NLP/ Speech RNN/ LSTM/ GRU × X X
Table 2. Comparison of methods for providing adversarial robustness quantification in NNs.
Method Certification Multi-layer Beyond ReLU/ MLP RNN structures handle cross-nonlinearity Implementation
(Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017) X × differentiable/× × × TensorFlow
CLEVER (Weng et al., 2018b) × X X/ X × X NumPy
SDP approach (Raghunathan et al., 2018) X × X/ × × × TensorFlow
Dual approach (Dvijotham et al., 2018) X X X/ X × × Not specified
Fast-lin / Fast-lip (Weng et al., 2018a) X X ×/ × × × NumPy
CROWN (Zhang et al., 2018) X X X/ × × × NumPy
DeepZ (Singh et al., 2018) X X X/ no .pooling layers × × Python, C
CNN-Cert (Boopathy et al., 2019) X X X/ X × × NumPy
POPQORN (This work) X X X/ X X X PyTorch (GPU)
the first layer recursively. Compared to existing methods,
POPQORN has three important advantages: (1) Novel - it is
a general framework, which is, to the best of our knowledge,
the first work to provide a quantified robustness evaluation
for RNNs with robustness guarantees. (2) Effective - it can
handle complicated RNN structures besides vanilla RNNs,
including LSTMs and GRUs that contain challenging cou-
pled nonlinearities. (3) Versatile - it can be widely applied
in applications including but not limited to computer vision,
natural language processing, and speech recognition.
2. Background and Related Works
Adversarial attacks in RNNs. Crafting adversarial ex-
amples of RNNs in natural language processing and speech
recognition has started to draw public attentions in addition
to the adversarial examples of feed-forward networks in im-
age classifications. Adversarial attacks of RNNs on text clas-
sification task (Papernot et al., 2016a), reading comprehen-
sion systems (Jia & Liang, 2017), seq2seq models (Cheng
et al., 2018) have been proposed in natural language process-
ing application; meanwhile recently (Gong & Poellabauer,
2017) and (Cisse´ et al., 2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2018) have
also demonstrated successful attacks in speech recognition
and audio systems. We summarize the RNN attacks in Ta-
ble 1. (Papernot et al., 2016b; Gong & Poellabauer, 2017;
Ebrahimi et al., 2018a;b; Cheng et al., 2018; Carlini & Wag-
ner, 2018) perform gradient-based attacks, while generative
adversarial network is used in (Zhao et al., 2018) to gener-
ate adversaries. We adapt (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) into
C&W-Ada for finding RNN attacks.
Robustness verification for neural networks. To safe-
guard against misclassification under a threat model,
verification-based methods evaluate the strengths such that
any possible attacks weaker than the proposed strengths
will fail. A commonly-used threat model is the norm-ball
bounded attacks, wherein strengths of adversaries are quan-
tified by their lp distance from the original example. Under
the norm-ball bounded threat model, determining the min-
imum adversarial distortion of ReLU networks has been
shown to be NP-hard (Katz et al., 2017). Despite the hard-
ness of the problem, fortunately, it is possible to estimate
the minimum adversarial distortion (Weng et al., 2018b)
or to compute a non-trivial certified lower bound (Hein &
Andriushchenko, 2017; Raghunathan et al., 2018; Weng
et al., 2018a; Dvijotham et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018;
Singh et al., 2018; Boopathy et al., 2019). In (Weng et al.,
2018b), the authors proposed a robustness score, CLEVER,
for neural network image classifiers based on estimating
local Lipschitz constant of the networks. We show that it is
possible to directly adapt their framework and compute a
CLEVER score for RNNs, which is referred to CLEVER-
RNN in Section 4.
However, CLEVER score does not come with guarantees
and therefore an alternative approach is to compute a non-
trivial lower bound of the minimum adversarial distortion.
(Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017) and (Raghunathan et al.,
2018) proposed to analytically compute the lower bounds
for shallow networks (with no more than 2 hidden layers)
but their bounds get loose easily when applied to general net-
works. (Weng et al., 2018a) proposed two algorithms Fast-
Lin and Fast-Lip to efficiently quantify robustness for ReLU
networks and the Fast-Lin algorithm is further extended to
CROWN (Zhang et al., 2018) to quantify for MLP networks
with general activation functions. On the other hand, (Dvi-
jotham et al., 2018) proposed a dual-approach to verify NNs
with a general class of activation functions. However, their
approach compromises the lower bound performance and
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the computational efficiency of the “anytime“ algorithm.
Recently, (Boopathy et al., 2019) proposes a framework that
is capable of quantifying robustness on CNNs with various
architectures including pooling layers, residual blocks in
contrast to (Singh et al., 2018) that is limited to convolu-
tional architectures without pooling layers.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior work to
provide robustness verification for RNNs that tackles the
aforementioned challenges: the complex feed-back archi-
tectures, the sequential inputs, and the cross-nonlinearity of
the hidden states. In line with the robustness verification for
NNs, this paper is the first to study the robustness proper-
ties of RNNs (see Tables 1 and 2 for detailed comparisons).
Since it is not straightforward to define a mistake in tasks
other than classifications (cf. a mistake in classification
tasks refers to a misclassification), we limit the scope of this
paper to RNN-based classifiers.
3. POPQORN: Quantifying Robustness of
Recurrent Neural Networks
Overview. In this section, we show that the output of an
RNN can be bounded by two linear functions when the
input sequence of the network is perturbed within an `p ball
with a radius . By applying the linear bounds on the non-
linear activation functions (e.g. sigmoid and tanh) and the
non-linear operations (e.g. cell states in LSTM), we can de-
couple the non-linear activations and the cross-nonlinearity
in the hidden states layer by layer and eventually bound the
network output by two linear functions in terms of input1.
Subsequently, we show how this theoretical result is used in
the POPQORN to compute robustness quantification of an
RNN. For ease of illustrations, we start with two motivating
examples on a 2-layer vanilla RNN and a 1-layer LSTM net-
work. The complete theorems for general m-layer vanilla
RNNs, LSTMs, and GRUs are provided in Section A in the
appendix.
Notations. Let X0 = [x
(1)
0 , . . . ,x
(m)
0 ] be the original in-
put data sequence, and let X = [x(1), . . . ,x(m)] be the
perturbed frames of X0 within an -bounded lp-ball, i.e.,
x(k) ∈ Bp(x(k)0 , ), where superscript “(k)” denotes the
k-th time step. An RNN function is denoted as F and the
j-th output element as Fj(X). The upper and lower bounds
of Fj(X) are denoted as FUj (X) and F
L
j (X), respectively.
The full notations are summarized in Table 3.
3.1. A 2-layer Vanilla RNN
Definition. A many-to-one 2-layer (m = 2) RNN reads
F (X) = WFaa(2) + bF ,
1Proposed bounding techniques are applicable to any non-linear
activation that is bounded above and below for the given interval.
𝒙(𝟏)
𝐚(𝟎) 𝐚(𝟏)
𝐅
𝐚(2)
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𝒙(𝟐)
𝐖𝐚𝐱
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Input 
Sequence
Output
Figure 1. Graphical depiction of a 2-layer many-to-one RNN.
a(2) = σ(Waaa(1) + Waxx(2) + ba),
a(1) = σ(Waaa(0) + Waxx(1) + ba),
where F is the output, a(k) is the k-th hidden state,
σ(·) is the coordinate-wise activation function, and
Waa,WFa,bF ,ba are associated model parameters, as
shown in Figure 1.
Ideas. Based on the above equation, for a fixed j ∈ [t],
we aim at deriving two explicit functions FLj and F
U
j such
that ∀X ∈ Rn×2 where x(k) ∈ Bp(x(k)0 , ), the inequality
FLj (X) ≤ Fj(X) ≤ FUj (X) holds true. To start with, we
assume that we know the bounds for pre-activation y(k) =
Waaa(k−1) + Waxx(k) + ba (superscript “(k)” denotes
the k-th layer): l(k) 4 y(k) 4 u(k). We refer the l and u as
pre-activation bounds in the remainder of this paper. We
show that it is possible to bound every non-linear activation
function σ(·) in the hidden states by two bounding lines in
(1a) and (1b) associated to l(k) and u(k), and that we can
apply this procedure recursively from the output Fj(X) to
the input X to obtain FLj and F
U
j .
Bounding lines. Two univariate bounding linear functions
are defined as follows:
h
(k)
U,r(v) = α
(k)
U,r(v + β
(k)
U,r), (1a)
h
(k)
L,r(v) = α
(k)
L,r(v + β
(k)
L,r), (1b)
such that for l(k)r ≤ v ≤ u(k)r ,
eq.(1b) ≤ σ(v) ≤ eq.(1a),
where the r in the subscript implies the dependency of the
derived lines on neurons. Both the slopes and intercepts are
functions of pre-activation bounds.
Derivation. We exemplify how a 2-layer vanilla RNN can
be bounded:
Fj(X) = W
Fa
j,: a
(2) + bFj = W
Fa
j,: σ(y
(2)) + bFj . (2)
We use s upper-bounding lines h(2)U,r(y
(2)
r ), r ∈ [s], and also
use variables λ(2)j,r and ∆
(2)
r,j to denote the slopes in front of
POPQORN: Quantifying Robustness of Recurrent Neural Networks
Table 3. Table of Notation
Notation Definition Notation Definition Notation Definition
t number of output classes F : Rn×m → Rt network classifier X0 ∈ Rn×m original input
n size of input frames x(k) ∈ Rn the k-th input frame [K] set {1, 2, · · · ,K}
s number of neurons in a layer FLj (X) : Rn×m → R linear lower bound of Fj(X) Bp(x(k)0 , ) {x | ‖x− x(k)0 ‖p ≤ }m number of network layers FUj (X) : Rn×m → R linear upper bound of Fj(X)
a0 initial hidden state γLj global lower bound of Fj(X) l 4 y 4 u lr ≤ yr ≤ ur,
c0 initial cell state γUj global upper bound of Fj(X) ∀ r ∈ [s], l,y,u ∈ Rs
y
(2)
r and intercepts in the parentheses:
λ
(2)
j,r =
{
α
(2)
U,r if W
Fa
j,r ≥ 0;
α
(2)
L,r if W
Fa
j,r < 0;
∆
(2)
r,j =
{
β
(2)
U,r if W
Fa
j,r ≥ 0;
β
(2)
L,r if W
Fa
j,r < 0,
and obtain
Fj(X) ≤ (WFaj,:  λ(2)j,: )(y(2) + ∆(2):,j ) + bFj ,
where  is the Hadamard (i.e. element-wise) product. To
simplify notation, we let Λ(2)j,: := W
Fa
j,:  λ(2)j,: and have
Fj(X) ≤ W˜aa(2)j,: a(1) + W˜ax(2)j,: x(2) + b˜(2)j ,
where
W˜
aa(2)
j,: = Λ
(2)
j,: W
aa, W˜
ax(2)
j,: = Λ
(2)
j,: W
ax,
b˜
(2)
j = Λ
(2)
j,: (b
a + ∆
(2)
:,j ) + b
F
j .
Substituting a(1) with its definition yields
Fj(X) ≤ W˜aa(2)j,: σ(y(1)) + W˜ax(2)j,: x(2) + b˜(2)j . (3)
Note that Equations (2) and (3) are in similar forms. Thus
we can bound σ(y(1)) by s linear functions h(1)U,r(y
(1)
r ), r ∈
[s] and use λ(1)j,r and ∆
(1)
r,j to denote slopes in front of y
(1)
r
and intercepts in the parentheses:
λ
(1)
j,r =
{
α
(1)
U,r if W˜
aa(2)
j,r ≥ 0;
α
(1)
L,r if W˜
aa(2)
j,r < 0;
∆
(1)
r,j =
{
β
(1)
U,r if W˜
aa(2)
j,r ≥ 0;
β
(1)
L,r if W˜
aa(2)
j,r < 0,
and let Λ(1)j,: := W˜
aa(2)
j,:  λ(1)j,: . Then we have
Fj(X) ≤ Λ(1)j,: Waaa(0) +
2∑
z=1
Λ
(z)
j,: W
axx(z)
+
2∑
z=1
Λ
(z)
j,: (b
a + ∆
(z)
:,j ) + b
F
j .
So far we have derived an explicit linear function on the
right-hand side of the above inequality. We denote it herein
as FUj and we have Fj(X) ≤ FUj (X), ∀X ∈ Rn×2 where
x(k) ∈ Bp(x(k)0 , ). A closed-form global upper bound
γUj can be obtained naturally by maximizing F
U
j (X) for
all possible X, which can be directly solved by applying
Holder’s inequality. Hence we obtain
γUj = Λ
(1)
j,: W
aaa(0) +
2∑
z=1
‖Λ(z)j,: Wax‖q
+
2∑
z=1
Λ
(z)
j,: W
axx
(z)
0 +
2∑
z=1
Λ
(z)
j,: (b
a + ∆
(z)
:,j ) + b
F
j .
An explicit function FLj and a closed-form global lower
bound γLj can also be found through similar steps and by
minimizing FLj (X) instead. During the derivation, we have
limited perturbations to be uniform across input frames,
which assemble noises in cameras. However, the above
method is also applicable to non-uniform distortions. For
example, we can also certify bounds for distortions on parts
of the input frames, which on the other hand are of more
interests in natural language processing tasks.
3.2. A 1-layer Long Short-term Memory Network
For an RNN with LSTM units, we can also derive analytic
upper-bounding and lower-bounding functions. In this ex-
ample, we inherit the notations in Table 3, and exemplify
through a 1-layer (m = 1) LSTM as shown in Figure 2.
LSTM. The following updating equations are adopted:
Input gate: i(k) = σ(Wixx(k) + Wiaa(k−1) + bi);
Forget gate: f (k) = σ(Wfxx(k) + Wfaa(k−1) + bf );
Cell gate: g(k) = tanh(Wgxx(k) + Wgaa(k−1) + bg);
Output gate: o(k) = σ(Woxx(k) + Woaa(k−1) + bo);
Cell state: c(k) = f (k)  c(k−1) + i(k)  g(k);
Hidden state: a(k) = o(k)  tanh(c(k)).
Again, the σ(·) denotes the coordinate-wise sigmoid func-
tion and tanh(·) is the coordinate-wise hyperbolic tan-
gent function. Output F of the network is determined by
F (X) = WFaa(m) + bF , and we have pre-activations as
yi(k) = Wixx(k) + Wiaa(k−1) + bi;
yf(k) = Wfxx(k) + Wfaa(k−1) + bf ;
yg(k) = Wgxx(k) + Wgaa(k−1) + bg;
yo(k) = Woxx(k) + Woaa(k−1) + bo.
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𝐚(𝟎)
𝐅
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× ×
𝛔 𝛔 𝛔𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐡
𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐡
Figure 2. Graphical depiction of a 1-layer LSTM network
Ideas. When deriving the lower bounds and upper bounds
of LSTMs, we have also made an important assumption:
we assume we know the bounds for hidden/cell states. This
assumption, as well as the assumption made when deriving
for vanilla RNNs and GRUs, can be easily fulfilled as the
bounds of hidden/cell states are available by similar deriva-
tions as will be shown below. We refer readers to Theorem
A.2 (vanilla RNNs), Corollary A.3/ Theorem A.4 (LSTMs)
and Corollary A.6 (GRUs) in the appendix for details.
Recalling that in Section 3.1, we aim at bounding the non-
linearity using univariate linear functions. Final bounds are
obtained by recursively propagating the linear bounds from
the output layer back to the first layer. Here when analyzing
the bounds for an LSTM, we adopt a similar approach of
propagating linear bounds from the last layer to the first.
However, different from the vanilla RNN, the difficulty
of reaching this goal lies in bounding more complex non-
linearities. In an LSTM, we cope with two different non-
linear functions:
σ(v)z and σ(v) tanh(z),
both of which are dependent on two variables and are cross
terms of varied gates. To deal with this, we extend our
previous ideas to using planes instead of lines to bound
these cross terms. The graphical illustration of the bounding
planes is shown in Figure 3.
Bounding planes. With bounds of hidden/cell states, we
can gather bounds: lgate(1) 4 ygate(1) 4 ugate(1) where gate
= {i, f, g, o} and superscript “(1)” denotes the layer we are
at. As both variables are bounded as above and compactness
is a continuous invariant, we are guaranteed to have at least
two bounding planes for the non-linearities. For example,
for σ(v)z we have planes:
h
cross(1)
U,r = max(σ(v)z), h
cross(1)
L,r = min(σ(v)z).
In practice, we use the following planes:
h
cross(1)
U,r (v, z) = α
cross(1)
U,r v + β
cross(1)
U,r z + γ
cross(1)
U,r , (4a)
h
cross(1)
L,r (v, z) = α
cross(1)
L,r v + β
cross(1)
L,r z + γ
cross(1)
L,r , (4b)
𝝈 𝒗 ⋅ tanh(𝒛)
𝒉𝑼 (𝒗, 𝒛)
𝒉𝑳 (𝒗, 𝒛)
Figure 3. Illustration of the upper-bounding plane hU (v, z) and
lower-bounding plane hL(v, z) of σ(v) tanh(z).
that satisfy
eq.(4b) ≤ σ(v)z ≤ eq.(4a),
where the r in the subscript implies the dependency of the de-
rived planes on neurons, and superscript cross∈ {ig, oc, fc}
tracks the origins of those cross terms. For example,
cross= ig when it is the coupling of input gates and cell
gates: v = yi(1) and z = yg(1). Notably, slopes and inter-
cepts, say αig(1)U,r depends on ranges of y
i(1)
r and y
g(1)
r . We
formulate the task of finding bounding planes as a con-
strained optimization problem and use gradient descent
method to solve it (see Section A.4 in the appendix for
details).
Derivation. We now exemplify how a 1-layer LSTM can
be bounded:
Fj(X) = W
Fa
j,: a
(1) + bFj ,
= WFaj,: [σ(y
o(1)) tanh(c(1))] + bFj . (5)
To bound Equation (5), we use s upper-bounding planes
h
oc(1)
U,r (y
o(1), c(1)), r ∈ [s], and also define λoc(1)j,r , ∆oc(1)j,r
and ϕoc(1)j,r in the parentheses:
λ
oc(1)
j,r =
{
α
oc(1)
U,r if W
Fa
j,r ≥ 0;
α
oc(1)
L,r if W
Fa
j,r < 0;
∆
oc(1)
j,r =
{
β
oc(1)
U,r if W
Fa
j,r ≥ 0;
β
oc(1)
L,r if W
Fa
j,r < 0;
ϕ
oc(1)
j,r =
{
γ
oc(1)
U,r if W
Fa
j,r ≥ 0;
γ
oc(1)
L,r if W
Fa
j,r < 0;
and obtain
Fj(X) ≤ (WFaj,:  λoc(1)j,: )yo(1) + (WFaj,: ∆oc(1)j,: )c(1)
+
s∑
r=1
(WFaj,rϕ
oc(1)
j,r ) + b
F
j .
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Table 4. Quantified robustness bounds for various RNNs.
Networks γLj ≤ Fj ≤ γUj Closed-form formulas
Vanilla RNN Upper bounds γ
U
j Λ
(0)
j,: a
(0) +
∑m
k=1 ‖Λ(k)j,: Wax‖q +
∑m
k=1 Λ
(k)
j,: W
axx
(k)
0 +
∑m
k=1 Λ
(k)
j,: (b
a + ∆
(k)
:,j ) + b
F
j
Lower bound γLj Ω
(0)
j,: a
(0) −∑mk=1 ‖Ω(k)j,: Wax‖q +∑mk=1 Ω(k)j,: Waxx(k)0 +∑mk=1 Ω(k)j,: (ba + Θ(k):,j ) + bFj
LSTM Upper bounds γ
U
j W˜
a(1)
U,j,:a
(0) + Λ
fc(1)
∆,j,: c
(0) +
∑m
k=1 ‖W˜x(k)U,j,:‖q +
∑m
k=1 W˜
x(k)
U,j,:x
(k)
0 +
∑m
k=1 b˜
(k)
U,j + b
F
j
Lower bound γLj W˜
a(1)
L,j,:a
(0) + Ω
fc(1)
Θ,j,: c
(0) −∑mk=1 ‖W˜x(k)L,j,:‖q +∑mk=1 W˜x(k)L,j,:x(k)0 +∑mk=1 b˜(k)L,j + bFj
GRU Upper bounds γ
U
j W˜
a(1)
U,j,:a
(0) +
∑m
k=1 ‖W˜x(k)U,j,:‖q +
∑m
k=1 W˜
x(k)
U,j,:x
(k)
0 +
∑m
k=1 b˜
(k)
U,j + b
F
j
Lower bound γLj W˜
a(1)
L,j,:a
(0) −∑mk=1 ‖W˜x(k)L,j,:‖q +∑mk=1 W˜x(k)L,j,:x(k)0 +∑mk=1 b˜(k)L,j + bFj
Remark: see Section A in the appendix for detailed proofs and definitions.
For simplicity, we further collect the summing weights of
yo(1) and c(1) into row vectors Λoc(1)λ,j,: and Λ
oc(1)
∆,j,: , and con-
stants (excepts bFj ) into Λ
oc(1)
ϕ,j,r . Thereafter, we have
Fj(X)
≤ (Λoc(1)λ,j,: Wox)x(1) + (Λoc(1)λ,j,: Woa)a(0) + Λoc(1)λ,j,: bo
+ Λ
oc(1)
∆,j,: [(σ(y
f(1)) c(0) + σ(yi(1)) tanh(yg(1))]
+
s∑
r=1
Λ
oc(1)
ϕ,j,r + b
F
j . (6)
Then to bound the two cross terms in Equation (6),
we use upper-bounding planes hfc(1)U,r (y
f(1), c(0)) and
h
ig(1)
U,r (y
i(1),yg(1)), r ∈ [s]. We define λcross′(1)j,r , ∆cross
′(1)
j,r ,
ϕ
cross′(1)
j,r for cross
′ = {fc, ig} as in the parentheses:
λ
cross′(1)
j,r =
{
α
cross′(1)
U,r if Λ
oc(1)
∆,j,r ≥ 0;
α
cross′(1)
L,r if Λ
oc(1)
∆,j,r < 0;
∆
cross′(1)
j,r =
{
β
cross′(1)
U,r if Λ
oc(1)
∆,j,r ≥ 0;
β
cross′(1)
L,r if Λ
oc(1)
∆,j,r < 0;
ϕ
cross′(1)
j,r =
{
γ
cross′(1)
U,r if Λ
oc(1)
∆,j,r ≥ 0;
γ
cross′(1)
L,r if Λ
oc(1)
∆,j,r < 0;
and obtain
Fj(X) ≤ pxx(1) + paa(0) + Λfc(1)λ,j,: yf(1) + Λfc(1)∆,j,: c(0)
+ Λ
ig(1)
λ,j,: y
i(1) + Λ
ig(1)
∆,j,:y
g(1) + pb + b
F
j .
where
px = Λ
oc(1)
λ,j,: W
ox, pa = Λ
oc(1)
λ,j,: W
oa,
Λ
fc(1)
λ,j,: = Λ
oc(1)
∆,j,:  λfc(1)j,: , Λfc(1)∆,j,: = Λoc(1)∆,j,: ∆fc(1)j,: ,
Λ
ig(1)
λ,j,: = Λ
oc(1)
∆,j,:  λig(1)j,: , Λig(1)∆,j,: = Λoc(1)∆,j,: ∆ig(1)j,: ,
Λ
fc(1)
ϕ,j,: = Λ
oc(1)
∆,j,:  ϕfc(1)j,: , Λig(1)ϕ,j,: = Λoc(1)∆,j,:  ϕig(1)j,: ,
pb =
s∑
r=1
(Λ
fc(1)
ϕ,j,r + Λ
ig(1)
ϕ,j,r + Λ
oc(1)
ϕ,j,r ) + Λ
oc(1)
λ,j,: b
o.
Substituting yf(1), c(0),yi(1),yg(1) with their definitions
renders
Fj(X) ≤ W˜x(1)U,j,:x(1) + W˜a(1)U,j,:a(0) + b˜(1)U,j + Λfc(1)∆,j,: c(0),
where
W˜
x(1)
U,j,: = Λ
oc(1)
λ,j,: W
ox + Λ
fc(1)
λ,j,: W
fx + Λ
ig(1)
λ,j,: W
ix
+ Λ
ig(1)
∆,j,:W
gx,
W˜
a(1)
U,j,: = Λ
oc(1)
λ,j,: W
oa + Λ
fc(1)
λ,j,: W
fa + Λ
ig(1)
λ,j,: W
ia
+ Λ
ig(1)
∆,j,:W
ga,
b˜
(1)
U,j = [Λ
oc(1)
λ,j,: b
o + Λ
fc(1)
λ,j,: b
f + Λ
ig(1)
λ,j,: b
i + Λ
ig(1)
∆,j,:b
g
+
s∑
r=1
(Λ
oc(1)
ϕ,j,r + Λ
fc(1)
ϕ,j,r + Λ
ig(1)
ϕ,j,r)] + b
F
j .
A closed-form global upper bound γUj can thereafter be
obtained by applying Holder’s inequality:
γUj = ‖W˜x(1)U,j,:‖q + W˜x(1)U,j,:x(1)0 + W˜a(1)U,j,:a(0) + b˜(z)U,j
+ Λ
fc(1)
∆,j,: c
(0).
An explicit function FLj and a closed-form global lower
bound γLj can also be found through similar steps such
that γLj ≤ FLj (X) ≤ Fj(X), ∀ X ∈ Rn×2 where x(k) ∈
Bp(x(k)0 , ). The derivations for a GRU follow similarly,
and are put into the appendix (Section A.7) due to space
constraint.
3.3. Robustness Quantification Algorithm
As summarized in Table 4, given a trained vanilla RNN,
LSTM or GRU, input sequence X0 ∈ Rn×m, lp ball param-
eters p ≥ 1 and  ≥ 0, for ∀ j ∈ [t], 1/q = 1− 1/p, there
exist two fixed values γLj and γ
U
j such that ∀ X ∈ Rn×m
where x(k) ∈ Bp(x(k)0 , ), the inequality γLj ≤ Fj(X) ≤
γUj holds true. Now suppose the label of the input sequence
is j, we aim at utilizing the uniform global bounds in Table 4
to find the largest possible lower bound j of untargeted at-
tacks. We formalize the objective and constraints as follows:
j = max

, s.t. γLj () ≥ γUi (), ∀i 6= j.
To verify the largest possible lower bound ˆ of targeted
attacks (target class be i), we solve the following:
ˆ(i, j) = max

, s.t. γLj () ≥ γUi ().
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Input: initialize 𝝐: = 𝝐𝟎 , 
trained RNN, test sequence 𝑿,
threshold 𝝉
Compute bounds
𝜸𝒋
𝑳, 𝜸𝒋
𝑼 of 𝑭𝒋
according to Table 4.
∃𝒊 ≠ 𝒋, 
𝜸𝒊
𝑼 ≥ 𝜸𝒋
𝑳?
YES NO
𝝐 is a lower bound of adversarial 
distortion; increase 𝝐 using a 
binary search procedure
𝝐 is not a lower bound of 
adversarial distortion; decrease 𝝐
using a binary search procedure
Stopping 
criteria are
met?
Robustness 
bound 𝝐𝒋: = 𝝐
YES
NO
Stopping criteria:
1) a prescribed maximum 
number of iterations; or
2) when search interval falls 
below the given tolerance 𝜏.
Figure 4. Steps in computing bounds for RNN networks.
One can then verify that j = mini 6=j ˆ(i, j). Recalling
from the derivations in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, slopes and
intercepts utilized are functions of the input ranges. There-
fore, the global lower bounds γL and upper bounds γU are
also implicitly dependent on , preventing the above opti-
mization problems from having an analytic solution. In this
work, we conduct binary search procedures to compute the
largest possible j (ˆ). In practice, we start by initializing
the  to be 0 > 0 and deriving upper and lower bounds ac-
cording to Table 4. These are followed by a condition check
that governs the next step. If ∃ i 6= j such that γUi ≥ γLj ,
then we decrease ; otherwise, we increase . We repeat
the above procedure until a predefined maximum iterations
are reached or when convergence is achieved.2 Proposed
algorithms are summarized in Section A.2 and A.5 in the
appendix.
4. Experiments
Methods. The proposed POPQORN is used to quantify
robustness for all models herein. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no previous work done on quantifying
robustness with guarantees for RNNs. Therefore, we com-
pare our results with CLEVER score (Weng et al., 2018b)
(an estimation of the minimum adversarial distortion) and
C&W attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) (an upper bound of
the minimum adversarial distortion). We emphasize on ana-
lyzing the characteristics of the certified bounds obtained by
POPQORN and new insights they lead to. For comparison,
we adapt CLEVER score to accommodate sequential input
2The binary search converges when the interval falls below the
given tolerance.
structure and denote it as CLEVER-RNN. Specifically, let j
and i be the true and target labels, respectively. Assume
g(X) = Fj(X)− Fi(X) is a Lipschitz function, and define
Ltq = max {‖∇tg(X)‖q : x(k) ∈ Bp(x(k)0 , 0),∀k ∈ [m]}
where ∇tg(X) = (∂g(X)
∂x
(t)
1
, . . . , ∂g(X)
∂x
(t)
n
)T . CLEVER-RNN
score is then given as min { g(X0)∑m
t=1 L
t
q
, 0}3. We also adapt
C&W attack for our task and denote it as C&W-Ada4.
The adapted C&W-Ada puts higher weights on finding
a successful attack, and prioritizes the minimization of
distortion magnitude when an attack is found. We use the
maximum perturbation of all frames as the C&W score. We
implement our algorithm using PyTorch to enable the use of
GPUs. Using a server consisting of 16 NVIDIA Tesla K80
GPUs, it took about 4 hours to calculate certified bounds
for 1000 samples in LSTMs with 4 frames, and one day in
LSTMs with 14 frames. Except quantifying for LSTMs, the
remaining experiments could be finished in about 10 hours
using a single NVIDIA TITAN X GPU. More experimental
details are given in the appendix Section B.
Experiment I. In this experiment, we evaluate
POPQORN and other baselines on totally 12 vanilla
RNNs and LSTMs trained on the MNIST dataset. Table 5
gives the certified lower bounds of models found by
POPQORN, together with uncertified CLEVER-RNN
scores, and upper bounds found by C&W-Ada attacks.
Bounds obtained by POPQORN, CLEVER-RNN, C&W-
Ada increase with numbers of hidden neurons s in RNNs
and LSTMs, and generally decrease as the number of
network layersm grows5. The uncertified bounds computed
by CLEVER-RNN are similar to those found by C&W-Ada
attacks, yet it should be noted that these bounds are without
guarantees. A supplementary comparison among bounding
techniques (2D bounding planes, 1D bounding lines,
constants) for LSTM evaluations is provided in Appendix
Section B.1 (accompanied with theorems in Section A.6).
Experiment II. Next, we evaluate the proposed
POPQORN quantification on LSTMs trained on the MNIST
sequence dataset6. Specifically, we compute the POPQORN
bound on only one single input frame (i.e. we fix all input
frames but one and derive certified bound for distortions on
that frame ). After calculating bounds of all input frames,
we identify the frames with minimal bounds and call them
sensitive strokes. In both subfigures of Figure 5, each point
3CLEVER score is defined by min { g(X0)
Lq
, 0}, where
Lq = max {‖(∇1g(X), . . . ,∇mg(X))‖q : X ∈ Bp(X0, 0)}.
We refer readers to the appendix Sec. B.2 for the details.
4We refer readers to the appendix Sec. B.3 for the details.
5The provable safety region (lp balls) provided by POPQORN
are distributed across framelets. The overall distortion allowed for
an input sample is computed by m1/p.
6Freely available at https://edwin-de-jong.github.io/blog/mnist-
sequence-data/
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Table 5. (Experiment I) Averaged bounds and standard deviations (·/·) of POPCQRN and other baselines on MNIST dataset. POPQORN
is the proposed method, CLEVER-RNN and C&W-Ada are adapted from (Weng et al., 2018b) and (Carlini & Wagner, 2017), respectively.
Network lp norm
Certified Uncertified Attack Network lp norm
Certified Uncertified Attack
(POPQORN) (CLEVER-RNN) (C&W-Ada) (POPQORN) (CLEVER-RNN) (C&W-Ada)
RNN l∞ 0.0190/0.0047 0.0831/0.0398 0.2561/0.1372 RNN l∞ 0.0087/0.0018 0.1259/0.0594 0.3267/0.1804
4 layers l2 0.2026/0.0680 0.8860/0.3920 1.3768/0.6076 14 layers l2 0.0526/0.0119 0.6864/0.3172 0.9278/0.4218
32 hidden nodes l1 1.0551/0.2689 5.0033/2.6034 5.1592/2.4726 64 hidden nodes l1 0.1578/0.0328 2.6018/1.3142 2.1149/0.9671
RNN l∞ 0.0219/0.0047 0.1099/0.0503 0.2957/0.1374 LSTM l∞ 0.0202/0.0055 0.0765/0.0356 0.2546/0.1202
4 layers l2 0.2487/0.0592 1.2006/0.5240 1.7072/0.6757 4 layers l2 0.2321/0.0636 0.8302/0.3714 1.3321/0.5529
64 hidden nodes l1 1.3199/0.2984 6.4128/3.0360 6.9347/3.1543 32 hidden nodes l1 1.1913/0.3385 4.6858/2.2761 4.9689/2.2740
RNN l∞ 0.0243/0.0050 0.1405/0.0638 0.3537/0.1469 LSTM l∞ 0.0218/0.0052 0.1032/0.0470 0.2893/0.1260
4 layers l2 0.2818/0.0557 1.4698/0.6595 2.1666/0.8556 4 layers l2 0.2448/0.0618 1.0947/0.4403 1.6888/0.6705
128 hidden nodes l1 1.4362/0.2880 7.7504/3.6968 8.8906/4.2051 64 hidden nodes l1 1.2644/0.3250 6.0216/2.8502 6.6931/2.9917
RNN l∞ 0.0131/0.0031 0.0841/0.0421 0.2424/0.1291 LSTM l∞ 0.0218/0.0044 0.1227/0.0508 0.3303/0.1358
7 layers l2 0.1045/0.0371 0.6846/0.3283 1.0300/0.4527 4 layers l2 0.2491/0.0523 1.3225/0.5412 1.9379/0.7593
32 hidden nodes l1 0.4492/0.1088 3.2046/1.7024 2.9425/1.4266 128 hidden nodes l1 1.2839/0.2760 6.8665/3.0725 7.7319/3.2369
RNN l∞ 0.0131/0.0028 0.1013/0.0525 0.2660/0.1330 LSTM l∞ 0.0165/0.0044 0.0924/0.0446 0.2635/0.1290
7 layers l2 0.1113/0.0246 0.8121/0.4210 1.1454/0.4931 7 layers l2 0.1400/0.0369 0.7287/0.3434 1.0733/0.4694
64 hidden nodes l1 0.4499/0.0951 3.5476/1.8650 3.4262/1.6191 32 hidden nodes l1 0.5680/0.1563 3.2266/1.7095 3.2309/1.4733
RNN l∞ 0.0083/0.0023 0.0931/0.0506 0.2891/0.2004 LSTM l∞ 0.0099/0.0028 0.1220/0.0676 0.3148/0.1700
14 layers l2 0.0493/0.0139 0.5074/0.2538 0.7577/0.3859 14 layers l2 0.0593/0.0148 0.6688/0.3346 0.9088/0.3854
32 hidden nodes l1 0.1459/0.0399 1.9323/1.0724 1.6339/0.8493 32 hidden nodes l1 0.1805/0.0496 2.4880/1.3743 2.0035/0.9447
(a) digit “1” (b) digit “4”
Figure 5. (Experiment II) Heat maps of certified 2-norm bounds
computed by POPQORN. Left (a): an example of digit “1”. Right
(b): an example of digit “4”. Arrows indicate the order of strokes.
records the relative displacement from the previous point.
Heat maps are used to track the changes in sensitivities
(quantified robustness scores) with strokes . We identify
the starting point in Figure 5(a) with a circle. Notably, this
point has a relatively big certified bound. This implies the
loose connection between the starting point of one’s stroke
and the number to be written down. Another tendency we
observe is that points in the back have larger bounds com-
pared with points in the front. Since the position of a point
only affects the points behind it, points in the back have less
influence on the overall shape. Therefore, they can tolerate
perturbations of larger magnitude without influencing its
classification result. In Figure 5(b), we circle two points that
are near the end of the first stroke and the start of the second
stroke, respectively. These points have more influence on
the overall shape of the sequence, which is also supported
by the comparatively small POPQORN bounds.
Experiment III: Lastly, POPQORN is evaluated on
LSTM classifiers for the question classification (UIUC’s
CogComp QC) Dataset (Li & Roth, 2002)7. Figure 6 shows
two sample sentences in the UIUC’s CogComp QC dataset.
We conduct POPQORN quantification on individual steps
7Freely available at http://cogcomp.org/Data/QA/QC/
Example What is the name of Roy Roger ’s dog ?
ENTY 0.34 0.50 0.53 0.27 0.39 0.19 0.32 1.02 0.67 0.93
Example What is the fourth highest mountain in the world ?
LOC 0.47 0.75 0.95 0.67 0.48 0.55 1.19 1.11 0.85 0.91
Figure 6. (Experiment III) Two examples in the question classifica-
tion task. The upper row gives the sample sentence; the lower row
shows the POPQORN (2-norm) lower bounds of individual words.
“ENTY” and “LOC” represent entity and location, respectively.
(words), which guarantee robust classifier decisions as long
as the perturbation magnitude in the word embedding space
is smaller than the certificate. The 3 most sensitive words
(words with 3 smallest bounds) are underlined. In the first
example, the question is classified as “ENTY”(entity). Cor-
respondingly, name is among the three most sensitive words,
which is consistent with human cognition. In the second ex-
ample, the question is classified as “LOC”(location). Again,
mountain is shortlisted in the top three sensitive words.
More examples are provided in the appendix Section B.4.
Such observed consistency suggests POPQORN’s potential
in distinguishing the importance of different words.
5. Conclusion
This paper has proposed, for the first time, a robustness quan-
tification framework called POPQORN that handles various
RNN architectures including vanilla RNNs, LSTMs and
GRUs. The certified bound gives a guaranteed lower bound
of the minimum distortion in RNN adversaries, in contrast
to the upper bound suggested by attacks. Experiments on
different RNN tasks have demonstrated that POPQORN
can compute non-trivial certified bounds, and provide in-
sights on the importance and sensitivity of a single frame in
sequence data.
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